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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
EQUITRADE INTERNATIONAL, INC. 
and JAMES ALAN WEST, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
LEE ANNE BUSMAN, individually, 
BARTER CONSULT ANTS 
















Civil Action File No. 
2013CV233445 
ORDER 
Before this Court are Plaintiffs' Motion to Set Aside Consent Judgment and a Motion for 
Emergency Hearing and to Cancel All Levies on Plaintiff and to Set Aside Consent Judgment. 
Having considered the briefing, the Court finds as follows: 
Equitrade International, Inc. and James Alan West filed these two motions on September 
20 and September 22,2016 asking the Court to set aside the entry of a Consent Judgment filed 
on March 31, 2016. After entry of the Consent Judgment, a new term of Court began on May 2, 
2016, the first Monday of May. See O.C.O.A. § 15-6-3(3). "[A] judgment not based upon ajury 
verdict is considered within the breast of the court during the term of court in which it is entered, 
and a court may exercise its discretion for meritorious reasons to set aside a judgment within the 
same term of court." Miranda v. Stewart, 312 Ga. App. 290, 291 (2011) (quoting First Baptist 
Church, etc. v. King, 208 Ga.App. 250, 251(1) (1993». "Once that term of court has ended, 
however, a judgment may only be set aside under the procedures in O.C.O.A. § 9-11-60(d)." Id. 
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(d) provides "A motion to set aside may be brought to set aside a judgment 
based upon: (1) Lack of jurisdiction over the person or the subject matter; (2) Fraud, accident, or 
mistake or the acts of the adverse party unmixed with the negligence or fault of the movant; or 
(3) A nonamendable defect which appears upon the face of the record or pleadings." In addition, 
"Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the record and errors therein arising 
from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on 
the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders." O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(g). 
The parties to this action entered into a Settlement Agreement and General Mutual 
Release effective July 18, 2014 (the "Settlement Agreement"). Under the Settlement Agreement, 
West and Equitrade agreed to pay Lee Anne Hearn, I individually, a total sum of $72,000 with 
monthly payments made over 48 consecutive months. If Hearn did not receive a payment, she 
was entitled to file a Consent Judgment that was executed by all parties contemporaneously with 
the Settlement Agreement. If all payments were made, Hearn was to mail the Consent Judgment 
to West and Equitrade. Hearn has not received a payment on the Settlement Agreement since 
Aprilof2015. 
The Settlement Agreement also acknowledged that there was an outstanding IRS debt for 
Barter Consultants International, Inc. ("Barter"). Hearn was the President of Barter. The 
Settlement Agreement stated West and Equitrade would be "responsible for and assume the 
entire Trust Fund Debt and the charges directly associated therewith owed to the Internal 
Revenue Service on behalf of Lee Anne Busman [Hearn] and Barter Consultants International, 
Inc. and shall indemnify and hold harmless Lee Anne Busman [Hearn] and Barter Consultants 
I Hearn was formerly Lee Anne Busman, and will be referred to as Hearn throughout this Order, 
regardless of the name appearing on the various documents. 
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International, Inc., for said debt so owed to the Internal Revenue Service." In an Affidavit filed 
with the Court on April 1, 2016 (a day after the Consent Judgment was entered), West claims 
that on May 6, 2015, he received a Notice of Levy from the IRS (a copy of which is not before 
the Court). West claims the Notice of Levy directed Equitrade and him, personally, "to remit to 
the IRS all payments due to the defendants." West asserts he has been sending the payments due 
to Hearn directly to the IRS in order to comply with this Notice of Levy. 
Finally, Paragraph 4 of the Settlement Agreement states: "The Parties shall direct their 
respective counsel of record to execute and file the necessary papers with the Clerk of the 
Superior Court of Fulton County, State of Georgia, dismissing with Prejudice the Superior Court 
Action." The Settlement Agreement does not state when the papers dismissing the action with 
prejudice were to be filed. 
1. The Mutual Dismissal With Prejudice was properly vacated. 
On July 21, 2014, a copy ofthe Consent Judgment and a Mutual Dismissal With 
Prejudice were submitted directly to the COU1i and both were inadvertently filed on July 23, 
2014. The Court was notified of this error, and based on the terms of the Settlement Agreement 
and with the consent of the parties the Court vacated the "Consent Judgment." The Court also 
vacated the "Mutual Dismissal With Prejudice" by Order filed July 23,2014 and upon a Motion 
by Hearn's Counsel, entered an order directing the Clerk of Court to administratively close the 
case until the terms of the Settlement Agreement were met, at which time the Court ordered the 
parties to file dismissal of all claims with prejudice. Thus, as stated in the Order, the Court would 
retain complete jurisdiction to re-open the action if necessary. West now claims that he would 
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not have signed the Settlement Agreement if he believed a dismissal with prejudice could be 
reversed. However, he did not make this argument until nearly two years after the Mutual 
Dismissal With Prejudice was vacated and he signed the Settlement Agreement which expressly 
allows Hearn to file the Consent Judgment in this case should West and Equitrade fail to make 
required payments. A contemporaneous dismissal of all claims with prejudice would render the 
Consent Judgment contemplated in the Settlement Agreement a nullity. The Court would not be 
able to enter a Consent Judgment in a case which was dismissed with prejudice as it would not 
maintain jurisdiction. This is an untenable result under the Settlement Agreement since it 
explicitly allows Hearn to file the Consent Judgment in this matter if West and Equitrade failed 
to make payments. Thus, the Court had a meritorious reason to vacate the Mutual Dismissal 
With Prejudice and did so within the same term of Court. 
2. Was Entry of the Consent Judgment Properly Noticed? 
On February 25,2016, following the failure of West and Equitrade to make monthly 
payments under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, Hearn filed a Motion to "Motion to Set 
Aside Dismissal With Prejudice/ and Vacate the Administrative Closure and Enter Consent 
Judgment." In support of this Motion Kevin Moore, attorney for Hearn, filed an Affidavit of 
Non-Payment.' The time for filing a response passed, and the Court entered the Consent 
Judgment on March 31,2016. On April 1, 2016, Equitrade and West filed an out-of-time 
2 As noted above, the Dismissal With Prejudice had already been vacated months earlier. 
3 All payments due to Hearn were paid through her attorney, Moore. 
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response," without seeking leave to do so. The COUli did not consider this response as the 
Consent Judgment had already been entered, and Equitrade and West did not file a motion to set 
aside or vacate the Consent Judgment after these motions were filed. 
In their motions, West and Equitrade claim that they did not receive notice of the filing of 
the Consent Judgment until they were notified by a third party.? This Court moved to 
mandatory electronic filing as of October 5, 2015, after this case was administratively closed.6 
Upon reviewing the electronic service record for the Consent Judgment, it is evident that West 
and Equitrade's counsel were not served a copy of the Consent Judgment through the electronic 
filing software at the time it was filed. Though the E-File Order notified litigants that the COUli 
shall issue, file, and serve all orders electronically, in this particular situation, it is not surprising 
that Equitrade's counsel would not have registered for e-filing in an administratively closed case 
until required to make a filing. In this case, that filing was the April 1 out-of-time response filed 
after entry of the Consent Order. Under O.CG.A. § 15-6-21 ( c), the court has an obligation to file 
its decision with the Clerk of COUli and to notify the attorney or attorneys of the losing party of 
his or her decision. In this case, it appears that West and Equitrade's counsel were not notified. 
4 The out-of-time Response also refers to Exhibits that were neither filed into the docket in the 
case nor otherwise submitted to the Court. 
5 From the electronic filing system records, it appears that the April 1, 2016 response was the 
first document electronically filed by Equitrade' s attorney. On August 19, 2015, Mr. Moore 
filed an Affidavit of Non-Payment requesting the Clerk issue a Writ of Fieri Facias. This 
Affidavit was not electronically served. The Writ was recorded on August 23. Summons of 
Garnishment on a Financial Institute were served on SunTrust Bank on September 20,2016. See 
Busman v. West, No. 16GR000497 (Fulton State Court). Plaintiffs ask the COUli to cancel all 
levies, but the Court is unaware of any levies, and Plaintiffs have not provided a legal basis for 
this Court to grant relief from garnishments issued from the State Court. 
6 See Amended Order Implementing Electronic-Filing for Civil Cases, Admin. Order 2015-EX- 
01168, Fulton County Superior Court (September 16,2015) (the "E-File Order"). 
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"[U]pon a finding that notice was not provided as required by Code Atm. § 24-2620 [now 
O.C.G.A. § 15-6-21], the motion to set aside may be granted, the judgment re-entered, and the 
thirty-day period within which the losing party must appeal will begin to run from the date of the 
re-entry." Miranda v. Stewart, 312 Ga. App. 290,292 (2011) (quoting Cambron v Canal Ins. 
Co., 246 Ga. 147 (1980)). "The holding in Cambron serves to correct the prejudice caused by a 
trial court's error in failing to notify the losing party of the judgment." Vangoosen v. Bohannon, 
236 Ga. App. 361,362 (1999) (citations omitted). "Nothing in Cambron allows the court to set 
aside the judgment and then proceed as if no judgment had ever been entered." Id. "Rather, 
Cambron requires that the trial cOUli re-enter the judgment at issue." Id. Thus, the Court will 
re-enter the Consent Judgment in order to cure any prejudice to West and Equitrade pursuant to 
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(g) and the cases cited herein. Before re-entering the Consent Judgment, 
however, the Court will consider Plaintiffs' arguments raised in their out-of-time brief and these 
Motions that the Consent Judgment should be set aside as it was entered "without legal basis." 
3. Was Entry of the Consent Judgment Proper? 
Plaintiffs argue the filing of the Consent Judgment was without legal basis. Instead, 
Plaintiffs argue they complied with the spirit of the Settlement Agreement, the IRS Notice of 
Levy, and 26 US.C. § 6332. Under US. Code, "any person in possession of (or obligated with 
respect to) property or rights to property subject to levy upon which a levy has been made shall, 
upon demand of the Secretary, surrender such property or rights (or discharge such obligation) to 
the Secretary, except such part of the property or rights as is, at the time of such demand, subject 
to an attachment or execution under any judicial process." 26 US.C. § 6332(a). This section 
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discharges any obligation or liability to the delinquent taxpayer with respect to payments 
surrendered to the IRS pursuant to a tax levy. 26 U.S.C. § 6332(e). However, the briefs filed by 
Plaintiffs reference exhibits, including the Notice of Levy, that were never placed before the 
Court. Further, the Settlement Agreement makes clear that West and Equitrade are required to 
pay the money to Hearn individually and satisfy Barter's Trust Fund tax debt on behalf of both 
Hearn and Barter. By submitting the payments due to Hearn to the IRS in satisfaction of the tax 
debt, Plaintiffs are not satisfying the letter or the spirit of the Settlement Agreement. Instead 
they are using money owed to Hearn to satisfy the IRS debt that they also agreed to pay. West 
and Equitrade cannot avoid their obligation to pay past due taxes on the Trust Fund Debt by 
redirecting the $72,000 owed individually to Hearn to the IRS. 
Plaintiffs have not met the requirements to set aside a judgment under O.C.G.A. § 9-11- 
60(d). Plaintiffs have not shown this Court lacked jurisdiction to enter the Consent Judgment. 
As noted above, the case was administratively closed but the Court retained jurisdiction over the 
case to ensure the terms of the Settlement Agreement were satisfied and to enter the Consent 
Judgment if they were not satisfied. Likewise, Plaintiffs have not shown that fraud, accident, or 
mistake or the acts of the adverse party unmixed with the negligence or fault of the movant 
caused the Consent Judgment to be filed. At most, Plaintiffs argue Hearn was aware of the IRS 
Notice of Levy sent to Plaintiffs and they believed this was a proper basis to redirect payments to 
the IRS instead of to Hearn. However, Plaintiffs did not timely respond to the Motion to raise 
this argument and have not placed sufficient evidence on the record of the IRS Levy. Finally, 
there is no allegation by Plaintiff of a nonamendable defect on the face of the record or 
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pleadings. Finding no basis under O.C.O.A. § 9-11-60(d) to set aside the Consent Judgment, the 
COUli DENIES Plaintiffs' Motion to Set Aside Consent Judgment and DENIES Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Emergency Hearing and to Cancel All Levies on Plaintiff and to Set Aside Consent 
Judgment. The Consent Judgment will be refiled herewith to cure any possible prejudice to 
Plaintiffs. 
SO ORDERED this -f-!l!- day of October, 2016. 
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SERVED VIA EFileGA on All Registered Users associated with the case. 
Plaintiffs .; Attorneys for Defendants 
Pro Se Plaintiff: 
J ames Alan West 
3731 Northcrest Road, Suite 31 
Atlanta, GA 30340 
Attorney for Equitrade International, Inc. 
Shannan Collier 
3330 Cumberland Blvd., Suite 400 
Atlanta, GA 30339 
404-419- 7113 
Shannan@sscollier.com 
Attorneys for Lee Ann Busman [HearnJand 
the individual corporations 
Kevin T. Moore 
6111 Peachtree Dunwoody Road 
Building C, Suite 201 
Atlanta, GA 30328 
ktm@ktmtriallaw.com 
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